Wine Week 2026
Lower volume than a normal year, with profitable customer acquisition.
$84,486 net across 508 orders — counting the four days we deliberately held the ads live past the published close (through May 30). Revenue was down from a normal year on volume, while average order value stayed strong, half of buyers were new to the store, and acquisition was profitable on the first order.
Holding the ads four days past the close added $21,025 — a third more revenue.
| Wine Week, net revenue | Orders | Revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Through the published close (5/16–26) | 408 | $63,592 |
| Ads held live (5/27–30) | +100 | +$21,025 |
| Campaign as actually run (5/16–30) | 508 | $84,486 |
May 27 alone — 37 orders, $10,377 — was the single biggest day of the entire campaign, bigger than the 5/26 "close." Average order value over the four extra days ran higher than the core window ($166 vs $156).
The four extra days were efficient
- Meta · tail spend → return$1,682 spend · $3,169 attributed, 7d-click1.88×
- Google · tail spend → return$351 spend · $3,118 value8.9×
- Incremental ad spend, all-inMeta + Google, four days~$2,033
- Directly ad-attributed return~3× on that incremental spend~$6,287
Sales are Shopify Main, net, same scope as the headline figures. Meta tail revenue (7d-click) is still maturing — late-window clicks close their attribution window as late as ~6/6 — so the $3,169 / 1.88× can only rise.
2024 is the comparable baseline; 2025 was an anomaly.
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 * | 2026 | vs 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue | $122,902 | $128,277 | $63,592 | −48% |
| Orders | 784 | 715 | 408 | −48% |
| Units | 1,722 | 1,665 | 1,059 | −39% |
| AOV | $156.76 | $179.41 | $155.86 | flat |
| Net-new customers | 382 | 427 | 186 | −51% |
| Meta spend | $15,824 | $8,846 | $20,664 | +31% |
| Meta ROAS (Meta self-report) | 1.35× | 3.08× | 1.05× | −22% |
| Google Ads spend | $2,291 | $1,037 | $1,436 | −37% |
| Email (Klaviyo-attributed) | $55,671 | $43,437 | $17,577 | −68% |
Window held constant (11 days) for a fair read; as actually run through May 30 it was $84,486 / 508 orders (−31%), detailed on the prior slide.
Inventory and assortment were an issue.
Assortment — the bigger factor
- Products carried over from 20242024 offered 128 · 2026 offered 10924
- 2024 revenue from products not on offer in 2026~half of 2024's $123K$62K
The high-value specialty totes that drove 2024 — artist collabs (Amy Logsdon, Liesel Plambeck), monograms, Team USA, Gold — weren't offered in 2026.
Stockouts — secondary
- Chenille Window Wine Tote · Sagelast sold 5/18 · 8 days dark~$2.5K
- Chenille Window Wine Tote · Bricklast sold 5/20 · 6 days dark~$1.0K
Popular totes sold through mid-window — demand we couldn't fill.
Meta: ~$22,346 spent, ~$24,848 attributed (1.11×).
Worked
- Abigail prospecting → micrositedrove the #1 introducer · $16.3K first-touch~2.5×*
- RT · Past customerscross-sell2.27×
- RT · Stacked audiencebest volume · 39 purchases1.84×
- Instagram Storiesplacement · vs 1.0× feed1.78×
- Catalog prospecting$2,591 spend1.64×
Lost money
- Male targetingpaused mid-window~0×
Google Ads, by contrast: $1,788 at 7.3× — most efficient paid line, but entirely branded search (harvesting demand, not creating it). Meta creates the demand; Google and direct close it.
Meta Ads attribution.
| Meta's contribution | Revenue | % net |
|---|---|---|
| Meta self-report (7d-click) | $24,848 | 29% |
| Shopify first-party, assisted | $11,830 | ~14% |
| Last-click UTM | $7,740 | 9% |
Meta over-credits itself ~2.1× on the orders it can track — but these figures miss the demand it created upstream: the Abigail microsite ($16.3K, right) was ad-driven yet tracking-invisible. Modest on direct ROAS; a major demand creator.
Who introduced and closed
- Abigail Spencer microsite#1 introducer · 94 first-touch orders$16.3K
- Directthe closer · 172 last-touch orders$27.5K
- Emailassisted 97 orders$18.1K
- Google paidassisted 109 orders$20.0K
- SMS (Attentive)assisted 65 orders$8.9K
SMS shown as Shopify first-party ($8.9K assisted). Attentive's own dashboard reports roughly 2× the first-party figure (self-report, click+view) — the same over-attribution as Meta. (Attentive has no revenue API; dashboard export.)
Email is still the biggest channel, but this Wine Week, our engaged audience did not show up.
| Klaviyo (email) | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attributed revenue | $55,671 | $43,437 | $17,577 |
| Share of WW net | 45% | 34% | 28% |
| Conversions | 345 | 225 | 117 |
| Click rate | 0.37% | 0.59% | 0.40% |
| Open rate | 43% | 79% | 69% |
Attributed revenue is down 68% over two years — steeper than the 48% revenue decline. Email is losing share, and the click rate has stayed under 1% every year (opens are Apple-MPP vanity).
What it means
- Still the #1 channel27.6% of net — the largest single contributor in 2026
- The most credible number we haveKlaviyo's $17.6K matches Shopify first-party multi-touch ($17.4K) within 1% — unlike Meta (2.3×) and Attentive (2×)
- The problem is the click, not the attributionopens convert nothing; clicks do — and clicks are the line that's weak
Email reads near-zero in Shopify's last-click view (~$6K) because of a Klaviyo UTM-tagging issue we've identified; the native and first-party views above show its true ~$17.4K contribution. The priority for 2027 is the click rate — subject and CTA testing — plus the win-back sequence.
SMS sends are efficient but not thriving.
What's working
- Sales vs. the cost to send the texts$8.9K in sales · $2.8K in send fees3.2×
- Welcome auto-textfires on sign-up · 12% click$2.3K
What's not
- List shrank during Wine Week38 joined, 146 unsubscribed−108
- List is smallvs 85K on email — a quarter the size20.6K
- Concierge (paid human-texting add-on)premium feature · 11 days$182
Customer acquisition remained strong and profitable.
This does not offset the lower volume, but it indicates the response is to spend more efficiently, not to spend less.
Revenue/LTV figures, not yet gross profit (COGS needed). Main-store scope, May 16–30 acquisition cohort. Retargeting (2.3×) recycles customers we already own — prospecting is the only line buying new LTV.
A $1.80 lead returns ~$23 over its life — a 13× acquisition engine.
In the launch window — looks like a loss
- Leads capturedMeta lead forms · ~$1.80 each925
- Bought during Wine Week1.3% · $1.8K12
- Immediate return$1,774 on $1,641 spend1.08×
Over the full year — the real story
- Ever boughtmost converted after the window42 · 4.5%
- Lifetime spend from those leads$1.8K in-window + $19.5K later$21.2K
- Value per $1.80 leadLTV : CAC~13×
Caveat: some of that lifetime value is from people who were already customers when they filled the form — the true net-new lead LTV needs isolating before scaling hard. (2024–25 lead lists showed higher ever-buy rates but were mixed cohorts, not a clean Meta-only comparison.) Source: module16-leadgen-yoy.json.
The raw count overstates it — most of who we lost was never a customer.
| Email · last ordered | Unsubs | Lifetime $ |
|---|---|---|
| Active — within 12 mo | 57 | $17.4K |
| Lapsed / dormant — 1–4 yr | 53 | $16.2K |
| Legacy — over 4 yr | 19 | $4.4K |
| Never purchased | 417 | $0 |
546 email unsubscribes during Wine Week. 76% (417) never bought anything — losing their email costs nothing. Every unsubscriber who did buy bought handbags, not men's product.
SMS · text (Attentive)
- Net change in the window38 joined, 146 unsubscribed−108
- A separate audience from email87% of email-unsubscribers were never on SMS — the two lists barely overlap87%
- No SMS fallback for recent customersof the 57 active customers lost on email, only 5 are still reachable by text5 / 57
Separately, 48,161 dormant profiles were proactively suppressed (May 29) — a deliberate cost cut to a lower Klaviyo tier, reversible, consent untouched. 10 of the 546 were spam reports. SMS status is current (Attentive carries no opt-out date), so it reflects who's reachable now, not who left during the window.
Priorities for 2027.
- Build in the extended "always-on" window. Holding the ads live four days past the published close added $21,025 and 100 orders at roughly 3× on the incremental ad spend — and May 27 was the campaign's single biggest day. Plan the extension as a deliberate phase, not an afterthought.
- Influencer microsite works for prospecting — this year's partner microsite introduced 84 first-touch orders ($14.9K) as the #1 top-of-funnel driver. Run the play again, fix the Webflow→Shopify tracking break so the return is visible, and keep feeding it with the prospecting ads that work.
- Re-engage the 1,220 engaged non-buyers — 596 are existing customers with a combined $361K in prior spend — and improve the email click rate.
- Stop over-sending to recent customers. Wine Week's 11-day, 14-send cadence churned ~49 recent buyers (~$16K of lifetime spend); most of the 460 unsubscribes never purchased. Pace and segment the heavy sends to shield recent buyers, and grow the SMS list rather than deplete it. (Re-price Attentive against Klaviyo SMS once the contract figure is known.)
- Budget acquisition by lifetime value — new customers are profitable on the first order (2.1–3.7× LTV:CAC). Fund prospecting to that ratio, not to first-week ROAS.
Lower volume on sound economics, with clear priorities for 2027.
Volume was down versus 2024 — −31% once the extended ad window is counted — but average order value held, acquired customers are profitable, and the shortfalls were specific and addressable — primarily assortment — rather than a loss of demand. The unit economics are sound. 2027 is about directing spend toward what performed.
48,161 dormant subscribers suppressed — a lower Klaviyo tier.
Re-engage the 1,220 engaged non-buyers (596 proven customers, combined $361K) and lock in the extended ad window that added $21K this year.
Lead with the proven drivers — the influencer microsite, retargeting, the bag assortment — and measure Meta with a controlled holdout.